Posted on 31-3-2004
Why Bombs In Uzbekistan?
by Esmer Islamov*, 3/30/04
A series of bombings and shootings March 29 left at least 19
people dead
and dozens more wounded in Uzbekistan, according to official
reports.
Authorities confirmed two suicide bombings at the main bazaar
in the Uzbek
capital of Tashkent, but the full extent of the violence remained
difficult to determine, in large measure due to the government’s
tight
control over mass media and information gathering. Unconfirmed
reports of
numerous other bombings and shooting were circulating in Tashkent,
including a bombing late at night on March 28 near one of President
Islam
Karimov’s residences.
Uzbek officials quickly sought to link confirmed attacks in
Tashkent and
Bukhara to international terrorism. Prosecutor Rashid Kadyrov
noted that
the use of suicide bombers in the attacks "indicated foreign
involvement."
Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Sadiq Safayev said that the "hands
of
international terror" were behind the violence "Attempts
are being made to
split the international anti-terror coalition," he said.
Tashkent residents interviewed by EurasiaNet appeared to treat
the
government assertions skeptically. Many believed the attacks
to be
connected to pent-up popular frustration generated the government’s
ongoing crackdown on individual liberty, along with officials’
reluctance
to take action to improve a deteriorating economy. [For background
see the
Eurasia Insight archive]. "Why are we so all so poor?"
asked one man
interviewed near the Chorsu bazaar, scene of the suicide bombings.
The man
blamed the government for imposing restrictions that stifled
economic
opportunities for most Uzbeks. The majority of vendors at markets,
he
added, were operating illegally because they could not afford
to stay in
business if they followed government regulations, including
the imposition
of onerous tariffs on imported goods. As a result, they were
vulnerable to
police shake-downs. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive]
"People see no legal way to make an honest living. They
are desperate,"
the man said.
No organization has claimed responsibility for the March 29
attacks.
Kadyrov said a leading suspect was Hizb-ut-Tahrir, an underground
organization that has advocated the peaceful ouster of Karimov’s
government and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in
Uzbekistan.
Another prime suspect, in the government’s view, is the
Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
The web site, Muslim Uzbekistan, quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman
as
saying suspects were in custody and being interrogated. If a
Hizb link is
proved, it would mark a drastic break with the past for the
movement. Up
to now, Hizb has operated clandestinely, its activities largely
limited to
the distribution of anti-government leaflets and posters. [For
additional
information see the Eurasia Insight archive].
In recent weeks, the Uzbek government has mounted an intense
information
campaign against Hizb. Uzbek Youth Radio has led the charge,
airing a
series of scathing commentaries aimed at discouraging Uzbeks
from joining
the underground movement. "The wicked Hizb-ut-Tahrir, after
entering our
country, has been brainwashing our young people and hatching
various plots
to seize power by force," said a March 8 commentary. An
editorial aired
three days earlier said: "Hizb-ut-Tahrir members claim
they are going to
come to power by peaceful means. However, their leaflets call
on their
supporters to wage the holy war, jihad."
In a televised address late March 29, Karimov alleged, without
producing
concrete data, that "terrorists had been planning the attacks
for
six-to-eight months." The president announced that a state
commission had
already been formed to investigate the attacks. "From all
that we know,
the goal of the organizers of these crimes was the destruction
of popular
peace, in order to sow disorder in society and change the political
course
of the country," Karimov said.
Regardless of who was behind the March 29 attacks, it appears
that the
primary target was Uzbekistan’s security apparatus. Unconfirmed
reports
suggested that the Chorsu market bombings were specifically
designed to
inflict significant police casualties. The first suicide bomber
detonated
at approximately 8:20 am not far from the bazaar’s bus
terminal. It came
at a time when two police shifts were overlapping. Approximately
50
minutes elapsed between the first and second suicide blasts,
indicating
that the bombers wanted to give police time to sweep the area
of
bystanders, thus presenting a clearer, more concentrated target.
Both
suicide bombers were believed to be women. According to the
Muslim
Uzbekistan web site, there was a third, unconfirmed, bombing
at the Chorsu
market, in which a man jumped out of a vehicle and "plunged
into [a group
of] policemen and blew himself [up]."
A EurasiaNet correspondent arrived at the site of the Chorsu
explosions at
9.30 am The bazaar was closed and cordoned off by the police.
Out of about
15 policemen approached for an explanation, only one admitted
that there
had been explosions. Others claimed that "the market is
closed for a
sanitary inspection" or that they did not know anything.
Despite the
havoc, some Chorsu vendors continued to sell their wares, mostly
food
products, near the central entrance to the market. The rest
of the city
appeared relatively calm.
A palpable hostility for the police could be felt among onlookers
at the
Chorsu bazaar following the blasts. Many complained about arbitrary
behavior by law-enforcement officers. Some mentioned an incident
the day
before the blasts occurred, in which a vendor had been beaten
to death by
police. The circumstances surrounding the incident could not
be
immediately verified.
In addition to the Chorsu bombings, state television provided
information
about two separate attacks against police officers during the
night of
March 28-29 in Tashkent. One shooting incident near the city’s
Textile
Institute left two police officers dead. Another police officer
was killed
and one wounded in a shootout near the TTZ Tractor Plant. Unconfirmed
reports said an explosion occurred near Karimov’s Durmen
residence, which
is located in the same area as the TTZ plant. Shortly after
the shooting
incident at TTZ, police foot patrols flooded the area.
In addition, state-controlled media reported that an explosion
in the city
of Bukhara killed 10 people and 26 injured. Official accounts
said the
blast occurred in an apartment being used by "terrorists"
as a bomb-making
factory. At least two other bombs went off in Bukhara, Uzbek
authorities
said. The Itar-Tass news agency quoted Uzbek Foreign Ministry
spokesman
Elkhom Zakirov as saying no casualty reports had been received
from
Bukhara. The Interfax news agency, citing a source within the
Uzbek
Interior Ministry, said it was possible that bombings "were
planned in
other regions" across the country.
The March 29 attacks were the most violent incidents to hit
Uzbekistan
since a series of bombings in Tashkent in February 1999. Karimov
blamed
those attacks on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, but a definitive
link
to Islamic radicals was never produced. The 1999 bombings sparked
a
far-reaching government crackdown on civil rights, in which
thousands of
Muslims were arrested for engaging in non state-sanctioned forms
of
religious expression. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].
*Note: Esmer Islamov is the pseudonym of a freelance journalist
specializing in Uzbek political affairs.
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