Posted 14th November 2001

War Without Winners
Compiled by Alan Marston*

The collapse of the Taliban army in Northern and Western Afghanistan to the
forces of the Northern Alliance has taken only a day and is a boost for the
United States government's war aims. But there are is a massive but ... the
USA military can win the war on the Taliban but can they win the peace?
Which brings to the fore in billions of suspicious minds, is peace the real
aim of the US war on terrorism? We shall see.

The Northern Alliance now controls most of northern and western
Afghanistan, including the cities of Mazar-i-Sharif, Taloqan, Herat and now
Kabul. From Washington's standpoint, the sudden collapse of the Taliban war
effort in northern Afghanistan demonstrated the success of an operational
model - close US air support for Northern Alliance ground troops - that
Pentagon planners will now look to replicate elsewhere in the country.
According to the Pentagon sources, this model will be expanded as soon as
more US and British special forces deploy in sufficient numbers to direct
the bombing sorties. The sudden turn of military events will help the
anti-terrorism coalition press its offensive against what is considered the
Taliban's heartland in southern Afghanistan. Northern Alliance control of
the north greatly enhances its ability to resupply its troops, as weapons,
ammunition and other essential supplies can now be brought in overland from
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The victory will help a humanitarian assistance
effort. With winter looming, millions of Afghan civilians face the threat
of hunger. UN agencies hope to begin aid shipments from a depot in
Uzbekistan on November 13. Again, we shall see if this happens.

Peace dissolves terror, its the only thing that can. And not just any
peace. A terror-free peace stands on the firm foundation of social and
economic justice and fair-play. The ultimate success of anti-terrorism
rests on the establishment of governments and economies, everywhere.
Afghanistan is not the source of terrorism (though it is important for the
US's strategic control of global oil supplies), it's a global world,
terrorism is global and so must be peace and justice. Going on current
form, the prospect that the US government and military and its allies will
get a lasting peace in Afghanistan, even if that was the aim of the war -
which it isn't - is vanishingly remote.

A political blueprint for Afghanistan's reconstruction is lacking. The
United States has backed an initiative to forge a broad coalition under
Afghanistan's former monarch, Mohammed Zahir Shah. But details on the
composition of the Zahir Shah coalition remain sketchy. It is possible that
the Zahir Shah coalition will not take definitive shape until the Taliban
is crushed. Serious differences exist among key coalition partners over the
state-building process. Russia and Central Asian states have spoken out
against any Taliban role in a future Afghan government, and would likely
support a rapid Northern Alliance offensive on Kabul. Pakistan, meanwhile,
is anxious for Pashtuns to be well represented in a post-Taliban
government, and has announced its categorical opposition to a Northern
Alliance takeover of Kabul before a political coalition is ready to govern.
US diplomats face the impossibility of making a coalition of bandits into a
democratic government. That's why the cynic in me says that the real aim is
not a stable democratic government in Afghanistan, it is a puppet government.

The war is not won, even in the military sense. Conquering the Taliban will
not be easy in southern Afghanistan, where the radical Islamic movement has
its power base. Intelligence gathering difficulties could hamper
anti-Taliban operations in the south. The US-led coalition knows little
about the morale and the war plans of the Taliban leadership, or about the
sources of their continued outside support from radical Islamists in
Pakistan and in the Arab world. Pressure will increase on the Central
Intelligence Agency to develop sources inside the Taliban and al Qaeda, as
well as inside the Pakistani military, intelligence service, and
particularly the secretive nuclear weapons establishment. Already, the CIA
recently has taken action to expand its networks in the Arab Gulf states,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and elsewhere.

Current intelligence-gathering capabilities appears adequate to direct air
strikes, but the US government still does not know where bin Laden is, or
what kind of weapons of mass destruction he may have. Beyond the shortage
of reliable intelligence, the Northern Alliance is grappling with a
manpower shortage. Yet, even if it can find reinforcements, inter-ethnic
suspicions will likely limit the ability of the Northern Alliance, which
comprises mostly ethnic Uzeks and Tajiks, to operate in Pashtun-dominated
southern regions. Thus, before the anti-terrorism coalition attempts to
drive the Taliban out of Kandahar, a change of tactics may be in order. The
coalition may once again try to foster a Pushtun anti-Taliban militia force
that would stand a better chance of gaining the support of local residents.
Earlier efforts to create a Pashtun force were a miserable failure,
underscored by the summary execution of Pashtun commander Abdul Haq on
October 26.

Finally, the logistical challenge remains immense. Russia and Uzbekistan
did a good job supplying the alliance during its northern offensive.
However, if the Northern Alliance is to stand any chance of conducting
effective operations elsewhere in Afghanistan, more supplies from the
United States, Britain, and possibly Russia, will be in order. These
supplies need to be airlifted or shipped by rail across Russia and Central
Asia to the Uzbek-Afghan border, then trucked into the war-torn
Afghanistan, which is plagued by corruption and has a crumbling
infrastructure.

Meanwhile millions of Afghan civilians are dying from guns and hunger.

* Contribution used from Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Research Fellow at the
Heritage Foundation.