Posted on 18-12-2003
A
regional peace forecast
Palestinians and Israelis are weary of conflict but in Iraq
it could be just beginning, writes Brian Whitaker
Which will end first ... the occupation of Iraq or the occupation
of Palestine? It is a question that has been niggling me for
a while, and last week I put it to an eminent professor of international
relations.
His reply was succinct but would have got him no marks in a
university exam. "That's a very good question," he
said. Full stop, end of answer.
In the absence of any further guidance from the professor,
I am inclined to put my money on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
ending first - mainly because of a gut feeling that the Americans
will be stuck in Iraq far longer than they imagine.
Although the Israeli-Palestinian situation looks bleak at the
moment, two important factors suggest change. One is that ordinary
people on both sides are weary of the conflict. The other is
the existence of a broad consensus about the shape that an eventual
peace settlement will take.
While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may have almost run
its course, the same cannot be said of Iraq. The Americans made
the mistake of invading without much idea what to do next and
the aftermath has been a case of the deaf playing it by ear.
Despite the promise of handing power back to the Iraqis next
June, the most likely result is a weak and fractious government
incapable of surviving without American military support. As
yet, there is no road map for Iraq, and no consensus among experts
as to the best long-term political solution.
In Iraq, in contrast to the war-weariness of Israelis and Palestinians,
we also have a number of political elements raring to test their
strength as soon as the US gives them half a chance. If the
Americans want to prevent an ethnic and religious bloodbath,
the possible break-up of Iraq and untold consequences for the
region as a whole, they will have to stay.
By staying, they could become even more deeply embroiled than
at present, but that is the price of getting involved in the
first place. One recent prediction that the US will eventually
end up fighting Kurdish separatists is by no means beyond the
realms of possibility.
My hunch that prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace are better
than those for peace in Iraq was reinforced last weekend during
a visit to the Netherlands, where I was assisting at a workshop
for Arab and Israeli journalists.
It was one of a series of workshops funded by the EU and organised
by the Jemstone Network, which specialises in media training
in the Middle East. On this occasion discussion focused on the
Geneva accord - the unofficial peace treaty drafted by a group
of Israelis and Palestinians - and how the media should be covering
it.
Most of the Arab and Israeli journalists - about a dozen in
all - had met each other at previous workshops and, despite
their differences, had established a good rapport. Over dinner
on the last night they cheerfully exchanged jokes about Mr Arafat
and Mr Sharon, most of which cannot be repeated in polite company.
In much of the Arab world such contacts are still regarded
as treasonable, and several of the journalists who attended
did so at considerable risk to their careers. For that reason,
I was asked not to name any of them or say which countries they
came from.
Although almost everyone at the Netherlands workshop had concerns
about specific points in the Geneva Accord, there was general
agreement that it could provide a basis for official peace talks.
This is not surprising since the Geneva document draws on the
last formal Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, at Taba
in 2001. It is also very similar to a report issued last year
by the International Crisis Group setting out the organisation's
"best assessment of what both sides can accept as fair,
comprehensive and lasting and what, ultimately, their agreement
will have to look like".
The attitude of the Israeli journalists was especially interesting
because their views were so unlike what we usually hear from
Ariel Sharon. They were worried about the economic situation
in Israel resulting from the conflict and about Hamas and Islamic
Jihad taking over in the Palestinian territories if fighting
continues.
"This is a [warning] traffic light," one of them
said. "If there were free elections, Hamas and Jihad would
win, at least in Gaza."
For that reason, he suggested that Israel should make a deal
with Mr Arafat before the militants gained power. "The
strongest [peace] agreement would be with Yasser Arafat,"
he said.
The options for the future, as outlined by the Geneva group,
are three: perpetuation of the conflict, creation of a single
binational state embracing both Israelis and Palestinians, or
two separate states based on the 1967 borders.
The one-state solution, if implemented now, would have a Jewish
majority of 56% but this would disappear over the next 10 years
- in effect bringing the end of Israel as a Jewish state.
Demographic calculations by Professor Sergio de la Pergula
of the Hebrew University suggest Jews would account for only
51% of the population by 2010, 47% by 2020 and 37% by 2050.
A division into two states based on the 1967 borders, however,
would preserve Israel as a predominantly Jewish state, with
Jews accounting for 79% of the population by 2010, declining
very slowly to 74% by 2050.
These figures provide strong reasons why Israelis who want
to preserve the Jewish character of their country should support
the creation of a separate Palestinian state as soon as possible.
The journalists' workshop also looked at figures produced by
the Geneva group comparing the effect of a peace agreement based
on the 1967 borders with the effect of an Israeli withdrawal
to the line of Mr Sharon's new wall (which may be what Mr Sharon
ultimately has in mind).
A unilateral withdrawal to the wall would almost certainly
not end the conflict, but it would have other disadvantages
for Israel, too.
The border proposed in the Geneva accord is just 445km long,
but the meandering wall - if it became the border - would add
a further 268km to the border's length, making it correspondingly
more difficult to police.
The implications for the Israeli and Palestinian population
of a border based on the wall are also rather curious and illogical.
Adopting the wall as a border would mean annexing 345,000 Palestinians
into Israel, whereas none would be annexed under the Geneva
proposal. Mr Sharon's wall would also preserve 54 Jewish settlements,
housing 329,000 settlers. The Geneva plan would preserve almost
as many - 310,000 - but in only 21 settlements.
The territorial proposals in the Geneva document aroused relatively
little controversy among either the Arab or the Israeli journalists
present in the Netherlands.
The basic plan is to adopt the 1967 border with "reciprocal
modifications". This means that any adjustment of the 1967
line in one direction will be matched by an equal adjustment
elsewhere in the opposite direction. Both states, according
to the plan, will have their capitals "on the areas of
Jerusalem under their respective sovereignty".
What really exercised the Arab journalists, however, was the
question of Palestinian refugees, and at times the discussion
became highly emotional.
The Geneva document has been widely portrayed as abandoning
the refugees' right of return - which is obviously a plus point
for Israelis but a strong minus point on the Arab and Palestinian
side.
In fact, the document is a bit more subtle than that. It does
not so much abandon the right of return as omit to mention it.
It also sets out a mechanism that would give some of the refugees
an opportunity to return, if not the right to do so.
The document aims to give refugees a "free and informed
choice" of where to live, based on five options: Israel
itself (in limited numbers), the new state of Palestine, their
present host countries, third countries, or areas of Israel
that would be transferred to Palestine under the exchange of
territory.
It also talks of compensation for "refugeehood" and
loss of property. How much they would get remains to be seen.
A modest but reasonably meaningful payment of, say, $10,000
(£5,700) a refugee would cost around $40bn-$50bn and it
is unclear who would be willing to cough up the money.
It was plain from the discussion that more work will have to
be done on the refugee proposals, but there is also a substantial
gap between the expectations of the Arab public about the right
of return and what Arab politicians privately believe they will
eventually have to accept.
The journalists attending the Netherlands workshop had brought
with them press clippings relating to the ceremony in Geneva
where the accord was unveiled.
In the Israeli press, this had been the main news of the day
and the coverage, by and large, reflected debate in Israel about
the document. Some papers, such as the liberal Ha'aretz, were
more in favour of the document than others. One reported the
ceremony through the eyes of various Israeli celebrities who
attended - an actor, a chef, a comedian, etc - and all seemed
to be disappointed in one way or another. The chef, for instance,
disapproved of the food that was on offer.
On the day of the Geneva ceremony, Israel launched its biggest
military action in the West Bank since April. Some of the Israeli
journalists said they had suspected this was a stunt by Mr Sharon
to divert attention away from Geneva, but they had not allowed
it to displace Geneva as the main item on their front pages.
(One journalist said he had later investigated the timing of
the West Bank offensive and concluded that there were good reasons
for it.)
On the Arab side, judging by the clippings presented, the accord
was a less important story. Some of the Gulf newspapers had
not bothered sending a reporter to Geneva and instead had used
translations of wire stories. One of the journalists attributed
this to "reader fatigue" with the conflict.
There were also a number of hostile - one might even say ranting
- columns attacking the accord. Amid all the predictable opinions
there seemed to be a scarcity of hard facts, including detailed
discussion of the document's contents, though I was told later
that the Palestinian daily al-Ayyam had printed the text of
the accord in full.
One article complained that the authors of the accord had not
properly consulted the Palestinian refugees, but the indignant
writer seemed to have made no effort to interview refugees about
the proposals either.
What became clear from this clippings exercise was that ordinary
Israelis are probably better informed about the Geneva accord
than ordinary Arabs.
Israeli supporters of the accord are also using marketing techniques
to "sell" its proposals to the public, not only in
Israel but also among Jewish communities in the US. A leading
Israeli advertising man is said to be helping them.
Nothing comparable appears to be happening on the Arab and
Palestinian side. This is not necessarily the fault of Arab
journalists. There are practical difficulties which make it
hard for them to do things that journalists routinely do in
other countries - though there is more that they could do, with
a little ingenuity.
It may not be a journalist's job to promote peace but, as one
of the Arabs at the workshop noted, "it is a journalist's
job to promote debate", particularly when the end of such
a long-running and important conflict is almost in sight.
If parts of the Geneva proposals are not acceptable, then who
has a better idea? What are the alternatives? The Arab and Palestinian
public have a right to know, and to join in the debate.
|