It is almost an article of faith in some quarters that the surest
route to faster economic growth lies on a path strewn with lower
taxes. Sometimes, however, articles of faith don't quite match
the evidence supplied by the real world. Andrew Jackson, director
of research at the Canadian Council on Social Development, thinks
this is one of those times. He has pulled together some impressive
support -- much of it from the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development -- for his view. Mr. Jackson's thoughts on this
issue warrant a wider audience simply because they go to the heart
of Canada's debate over what to do with growing government surpluses.
Should they be converted into tax cuts or new spending or used
to pay down debt?
The newly elected Liberals have promised some of all three, but
several provinces have leaned heavily in the direction of tax
cuts, with plans to go even further. Ontario Premier Mike Harris
and Alberta Premier Ralph Klein regularly cite low tax rates as
a key reason for their provinces' strong economies. This is not
just political posturing. There is plenty of support in economic
theory for this view and plenty of economists who will defend
it.
The companion to this notion is that we have to sacrifice the
goal of income equality if we want a high-performance economy.
Governments with less tax revenue cannot afford generous social
programs, so less money is transferred from the well-off to the
poor. "The idea that society faces a fundamental tradeoff . .
. between social justice and economic growth is a staple of both
economics textbooks and contemporary political debate," Mr. Jackson
says in his study, which is available at www.ccsd.ca/pubs/2000/equity The
United States is usually portrayed at one end of the spectrum
-- fast growth combined with extreme inequality in the distribution
of income -- while European countries find themselves at the other
end, with relatively equal incomes, but slow growth. What happens
when you take this idea out for a road test? Some data from the
OECD suggests that in the 1990s, it crashed. The OECD compared
growth rates and tax burdens in 22 countries. The growth measure
was the annual increase in real gross domestic product per person
between 1990 and 1998; taxes were measured as a percentage of
GDP in 1994.
If you plot these on a graph where growth rates run up the vertical
axis and the tax burden across the horizontal axis, you'd expect
to find a pattern. High-growth low-tax countries would be in the
top left corner and low-growth high-tax countries in the bottom
right. But there is no pattern. Countries with similar growth
rates had wildly different tax burdens; countries with similar
tax burdens had wildly different growth rates. Among the G7 countries
alone, Japan, Canada, Germany, Italy and France all saw per capita
growth of about 1 per cent annually over that period. But their
tax burdens ranged from Japan's 28 per cent of GDP up to France's
44 per cent, with Canada near the lower end at 35 per cent. The
United States, with a tax load of 28 per cent, recorded growth
of 1.7 per cent a year, but so did Britain, where the tax burden
was closer to Canada's 35 per cent. Ireland's taxes were slightly
higher, at 36 per cent, but its growth rate was a staggering 5.5
per cent a year, the best of any of the 22 countries in the study.
The highest tax country was Denmark, at 50 per cent, but its GDP
per person grew by 2.3 per cent annually, better than the United
States' rate. When you repeat the exercise comparing economic
growth and income equality, the result is the same -- no pattern.
Denmark's incomes, for example, were more evenly distributed than
most countries, yet its growth rate was among the highest. If
nothing else, Mr. Jackson has demonstrated that there are no simple
recipes for strong economic growth. But then, in the real world,
there rarely are, despite what politicians would have us believe.
