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The plan failed, and "Episode Two" became another disappointment to the rebels. If the army mutiny had succeeded, it would no doubt have developed into another political coup. The plot is even thicker and involves a number of leading senior officers, under investigation for their role in the May putsch. The original idea of the May 19 putsch was to emulate the 1987 coup where the entire military closed ranks to execute the military coup. It was clinical and "efficient", so to speak. This time around, it didn't happen that way because the commander stood his ground and resisted any attempt to be pushed into the ultimate act of treason. Bainimarama's steady resistance simply reinforced his unpopularity amongst some senior officers who secretly plotted with Speight and who were also behind the attempted take over yesterday. The appointment of Bainimarama as Commander of the Army in 1999 was precisely for the purpose of ensuring that no coup would take place again. This was related to be by a senior Fiji government official when we met in Europe way back in 1999. Bainimarama was seen as a real "professional" soldier (someone committed to oath of allegiance to the nation and state), as opposed to a "political" soldier (someone who uses the military as a means of achieving political ends), like Rabuka. He was also seen as "too green" (because he was younger than some of the more experienced senior officers who were overlooked during the appointment). Besides, he was only a seaman, being Commander of the Navy - a rather small unit - and was thus considered a "marginal" entity in as far as the land Army was concerned. Now back to the attempted army takeover. Rabuka was requested by the rebel CRW soldiers to become negotiator, although the rebels had not precisely stated their demands. Rabuka's role as "negotiator" failed. Firstly, because the army refused to negotiate with the rebel soldiers who had taken over the National Command Center, Officer's Mess and the main armory. Secondly, the army suspected that Rabuka, who was in full military uniform as Major General (the highest rank in the Fiji Army), when he entered the camp, had other unknown motives. The attempted take over failed because firstly, their bid to take the Commander hostage failed. Secondly, when the rebel CRW soldiers captured the armory, there were guns but no ammunition-usually the two were always kept in separate armouries, primarily to avoid the sort of thing which happened. Thirdly, their hope of securing the support of their supporters in the rank and file of the regular force failed to eventuate. Loyal troops from the Nasinu Army Training School, Lautoka Army Barracks, Fiji Navy, Engineering Unit and the 3rd Fiji Infantry Regiment (3FIR), the largest single unit in the army, stormed the rebel position from all sides using light and heavy weapons. A number of attempted mutineers were captured and some escaped into the night. There had been rumours in Suva for a few weeks of an "military coup" of sorts. Even some overseas press had speculated about a possible coup. Relatives of soldiers on the camp had been warned of an impending vakadave dra (bloodbath). It was for this reason, that the army reacted quickly to muzzle Radio Fiji when it "quoted" an "army source" saying that the army "did not want" Seniloli, Vice-President and Speight sympathizer to act as President while the President was away in Australia for medical treatment. The army perhaps knew something, which many people (including local and international critics) did not know. The announcement, probably suspected to come from a Speight sympathiser in the military, was perhaps to provide a perfect political justification for the rebellion; that is the army under Bainimarama has insulted a Bauan high chief-thus Bainimarama had to go. It was also aimed at embarrassing Bainimarama, and worse still, it was a kind of a "call to war", a "signal" that, things "were ready". So it was just a matter of time, any time, when the conditions permitted. The big $1 billion heroin bust in Namadi Heights (scene of the fierce shootout) a few days earlier was just the welcoming diversion needed. Also, the operationcoincided with the President's absence from the country, so that Ratu Jope Seniloli would assume the Presidency if the revolt succeeded. The day was to be 2 November 2000. The army itself was not sure of where the uprising would come from, although they knew that plans of some sort were afoot. The failed insurrection has made things more "transparent", if I may misusethe term, because, now we know who is on whose side. The fact that the ultimate has happened means that once and for all, scores have been settled, and the army as the last bastion of state security has come out on top. The message to would be destabilisers, is now clear - any possible threat against the state will be mercilessly crushed. If Bainimarama loses his case, regarding the "illegality" of his abrogating the 1997 constitution, there won't necessarily be another coup. Bainimarama is not the coup-making type. But the threat from the rebels may still be real and may re-emerge in various forms. Again, an attempted coup, or Episode Two, has failed. Rabuka, the "father of Fiji coups", has been ordered by the army not to set foot on the Army Barracks again or "face the consequences". The plotters within the army officer's ranks, who had secretly hoped for the success of the operation and the neutralization of Bainimarama are now awaiting their turn to be caned by the seemingly invincible headmaster. The plotters hoped that through the success of the takeover, they would be able to escape the investigations into their involvement in the May 19 putsch. The violent gun battle was the ultimate manifestation of Fijian ethno-nationalism, laced with Fijian machoism. Many academics and commentators totally dismiss the significance of nationalism in Fijian politics, claiming that the conflict is based purely on Fijian intra communal power struggle. Others merely emphasize ethnic (inter-communal) conflict and dismiss the intra-communal power struggle. Both these approaches are myopic and superficial because they both over-simplify what is really a complex situation. The problem must be seen in the broader context of the complex interplay between intra-and inter-communal politics in Fiji. Tension oscillates between the two in a dynamic way. Issues which may have an ethnic origin, could easily develop into nationalist and even intra communal conflict, yet still maintaining an ethnic character. The putsch of May 19 is an example. The intra- Fijian communal power struggle was based on conflict over who "best" represented "Fijian interest" against "Indian threat". Nationalistic Fijians blamed "moderate" Fijians for being "too close" to and too facilitative of "Indian interests". For ethno-nationalism to occur, one does not necessarily need a "nation". The term nation itself is as nebulous as the term "democracy" or "development". It is, according to a well known sociologist, "an imagined community". Nationalism is a mode of perception and mobilization based on some shared symbols, culture, language, religion, historical experience or assumed primordial feelings and attachments. Some may be based on "real" historical conditions while some may be based on politically constructed claims. Fijian ethno-nationalism was very much a British colonial construct when diverse social groups were centralized under a patronizing colonial system through colonially constructed neo-traditional institutions such as the Great Council of Chiefs, Ministry of Fijian Affairs, Natīve Land Trust Board, Provincial Councils and Fijian Affairs Board. These institutions officially defined the political and cultural boundaries of "Fijianess", and also provided the cultural prism through which Fijians defined their identity and world-view in relation to "others", especially, the emerging "Indian threat". Although they were colonial constructions, over the years, these institutions have come to be regarded as "traditional" and immemorial part of the Fijian vanua (socio-cultural formation). The cultural ethos reproduced by these institutions became the basis on which the sentiments of common belonging or Fijian ethno-nationalism were nurtured and mobilized, to suit particular political purposes. Nationalist demagogues such as Butadroka, Rabuka and Speight, who had various political and commercial interests at heart, made use of the sentimental appeal to common "Fijian interests" and the threat of "Indian takeover" as a tool of political mobilization. The fact that the power struggle degenerated into intra communal conflict must not divert our attention from the fact that the issue still has a very strong ethnic component at another level. This comes to my second point about Fijian machoism. Nationalism in its violent form projects Fijian machoism to its most dangerous level. What we saw yesterday was Fijian nationalism and machoism "turned inwards". It was a battle over that shifty nationalistic space-who was strong enough to be the pillar of Fijian interest? Fijians see themselves as the most macho of human species. When I was young, we were consistently told by elders that to cry is being "un-Fijian", but to make others cry is to be "tough like a Fijian". Fijians like to romanticize about their physical prowess in wars, rugby and street fighting. War heroes such as Labalaba, the Fijian who died when fighting for the British SAS in the 1970s in Yemen (he1s still seen as one of the greatest heroes in the British Army), are seen as "model" Fijians. Fijian soldiers have on many occasions being commended not only as among the best peace keepers in the world (they are part of international peace operations in various part of the world-Lebanon, Sinai etc.), also as being among the finest soldiers in the world. For about ten years now, Fijian soldiers have been unbeaten in international competitions between international armies (including the elite US 82nd Airborne Division) on military skills, held annually in the Middle East. However, the political implication of this showdown is much deeper. Ethnic politics can spiral down in a complex way to cause internal feud and bloodshed within the Fijian community. Ethno-nationalism turned inwards could be self-destructive for Fijians. Violence could readily become a "normal" means of settling disputes. Violence and counter-violence could create an infinite cycle. Fijian nationalism and grievances must be seriously addressed and machoism contained, or else, what we have just seen may simply be a preview to the main show. The army and Fiji as a nation have once again won Episode Two. At least for now, the army has proven itself as a reliable instrument of stability in a situation where democratic institutions are seriously under assault by inter and intra-communal tension. Fiji needs time to settle and rebuilt itself shattered nation. Intra and inter communal national reconciliation is needed now more than ever. To rush blindly towards uncharted waters, pressured by local and international politics, in the name of "return to democracy" may not be sustainable in the long run. We did that after 1987. We are doing it again. What we have learnt from our history is that we have not learnt from our history! Let1s first identify where we went wrong and attempt to address the problems. Re-democratization must include soul searching, compromises, humility and reconciliation. It's Fiji's only hope.
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